Lectures on Pramāṇa-paddhati

Introduction

Pramāṇa-paddhati is a work by Śrī Jayatīrtha, one of the most celebrated commentators of the Madhva tradition. He is often referred to simply as Ṭīkākāra—“the commentator”—without any qualifier. It is no exaggeration to say that most works in the Tattvavāda or Dvaita Vedānta tradition are, in some way, linked to or dependent on Śrī Jayatīrtha’s writings.

Śrī Jayatīrtha lived about two generations after Śrī Madhvācārya, around 60–80 years later. He authored 21 works: 18 are direct commentaries on Madhvācārya’s texts, and 3 are independent treatises. Pramāṇa Paddhati is one of these three, along with Vādāvalī and Padyamālā. Though independent, these works too are deeply rooted in the tenets and ideas Madhvācārya expounded in his Sarvamūla texts.

Pramāṇa-paddhati belongs to the genre of Prakaraṇa literature. The classical definition, śāstraikadeśa-sambaddhaṃ śāstra-kāryāntare sthitam, describes prakaraṇa as a treatise that is focused on a specific aspect of a broader discipline (a śāstra). For example, if Brahma-mīmāṃsā-śāstra is the larger discipline, then the discussion on pramāṇa (epistemology) is one part of it. Prakaraṇa texts function like modules. They are not the entire śāstra but help students grasp the larger śāstra more easily.

As its title suggests, Pramāṇa-paddhati is primarily a study of pramāṇas. Paddhati means a path, method, or approach. Thus, the text is a “pathway” to understanding the concept and scope of pramāṇas in detail.

The Invocatory Verse (Maṅgalācaraṇa)

praṇamya caraṇāmbhoja-yugalaṃ kamalā-pateḥ |. pramāṇa-paddhatiṃ kurmo bālānāṃ bodha-siddhaye ||

As is customary, the text opens with a maṅgalācaraṇa, an auspicious invocation. Traditionally, every work begins with such an act, usually an obeisance to the Lord. This serves several purposes:

to situate the work within the larger frame of devotion and humility,
to remove potential obstacles to its completion, and
to ensure the work gains acceptance and circulation.

One might wonder why this invocation must be written, rather than merely performed. The reason is pedagogical. If the author bows silently and begins writing, students who are not physically present would remain unaware of the act. Writing it into the text impresses upon students the importance of beginning any work with such an auspicious gesture.

If a text lacks an explicit maṅgalācaraṇa, we may infer, based on the author’s character, that he surely performed it privately but chose not to record it, knowing students would already grasp its importance from other works. Here, however, the author writes it explicitly, and also states his purpose: kamalāpateḥ caraṇāmbhoja-yugalaṃ praṇamya bālānāṃ bodhasiddhaye pramāṇapaddhatiṃ kurmaḥ

This translates as:

“After bowing down (praṇamya) to the pair of lotus feet (caraṇāmbhoja-yugalam) of Lord Viṣṇu, the consort of Kamalā (kamalāpatiḥ), we compose (kurmaḥ) this work titled Pramāṇa-paddhati for the attainment of knowledge (bodha-siddhaye) by beginners (bālānām).”

Explanation of the Verse

Several terms in this verse are significant:

The plural verb kurmaḥ (“we compose”) is conventional for teachers or sannyāsins, but it also signals that the work is not one individual’s opinion. Rather, the author represents a living tradition, Madhvācārya and his direct disciples, speaking through him.
Bālānām refers not to children but to beginners: those new to the study of pramāṇas but equipped with basic skills in language and reasoning. Bodhasiddhaye means “for the attainment of knowledge” by such students.
The form praṇamya indicates a prior action: bowing to the Lord precedes the act of composition.
The imagery of the lotus-feet conveys tenderness, beauty, and spiritual majesty—not material feet, but transcendent ones embodying knowledge (jñāna) and bliss (ānanda). As Madhvācārya notes elsewhere, the two feet are called su and va, representing these qualities. Bowing to them is a prayer for knowledge and bliss.
The choice of the epithet Kamalāpati (consort of Lakṣmī) is meaningful. Lakṣmī is the bhāgyadevatā, the goddess of fortune. Engaging in śāstra study itself is a great fortune. She is also the presiding deity of speech (vāk) and mind (manas). Since purity of thought and expression is vital for any composition, her blessings are essential. At the same time, as Lord Kṛṣṇa suggests in the Gītā (chapter 12) and as Madhvācārya explains in his Gītā-tātparya, a separate worship (upāsanā) of Lakṣmī is difficult. The easier and wiser course is to worship Viṣṇu while remembering him as Lakṣmīpati, thereby invoking her grace as well.

The Four Preliminary Considerations (Anubandha Catuṣṭaya)

This single verse also encapsulates the anubandha-catuṣṭaya, the four preliminaries a text should clarify at the outset:

Viṣaya: the subject matter,
Adhikārī: the eligible student,
Prayojana: the purpose or benefit, and
Sambandha: the relationship between subject, student, and purpose.

Specifying these assures the ārambhaṇīyatva, the worthiness of beginning the study, and motivates students by showing its relevance.

In this verse:

the adhikārī is the beginner (bāla),
the viṣaya is pramāṇa, indicated by the title,
the prayojana is knowledge (bodha-siddhi).

Commentators add that bodha-siddhi implies more than acquiring knowledge. The immediate benefit (sākṣāt-prayojana) is knowledge of pramāṇas, but the ultimate benefit (mukhya-prayojana) is the fruit of that knowledge: the Lord’s grace and liberation (mokṣa).

The sambandha is this: the beginner studies Pramāṇa-paddhati to understand pramāṇas, which leads to the ability to appreciate and decipher the śāstras, thereby comprehending Lord Viṣṇu, receiving His grace, and ultimately attaining mokṣa.

Śrī Madhvācārya, in his Bhāgavata-tātparya, adds another reason for stating these four at the outset. Remembering the adhikārī, viṣaya, and prayojana pleases the Lord, who then ensures that the study yields its greatest possible benefit.

Why compose another work on pramāṇa-s?

An Objection (yadyapi …)

At this stage, one may ask: Why compose yet another work on pramāṇa-s? After all, many schools, especially the Naiyāyika-s, have already written detailed treatises on pramāṇa. One might argue that their ideas differ from ours, and therefore a Dvaita Vedānta perspective is required. Even then, our own Bhagavatpādācārya, Śrī Madhvācārya, has already addressed pramāṇa in works such as Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa, Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya, and Anuvyākhyāna. In fact, Śrī Madhvācārya has discussed every aspect of pramāṇa—its definition (lakṣaṇa), classification (vibhāga), and critical examination (parīkṣā). Writing another treatise on the same topic may therefore seem redundant.

Jayatīrtha’s Justification (tathāpi …)

Śrī Jayatīrtha acknowledges this concern explicitly but provides a clear justification. He explains that while Śrī Madhvācārya has indeed covered these topics, his presentation has two notable features:

Profound Language: His style is extraordinarily deep (gambhīrayā vācā); so a surface reading is often insufficient to capture the intended meaning.
Scattered Presentation: The relevant discussions are not gathered in one place but dispersed (vikṣipya) across many texts.

Because of this profundity and scattered arrangement, beginners or those with limited intellectual training (mandaiḥ) find it difficult to grasp the complete system of thought intended by Śrī Madhvācārya. Hence, this prakaraṇa text has been composed to collect these ideas and present them in a clear, organized, and accessible manner.

A Clarification

A clarification is warranted at this stage. Some texts describe Madhvācārya’s writings as accessible even to beginners (bāla-saṅgham api bodhayad bhṛśam), yet at the same time difficult even for scholars (durnirūpavacanam ca paṇḍitaiḥ). The same is said of Vedavyāsa’s works, such as the Mahābhārata, which are described as sarvaprāṇinām avagāhya-anavagāhyarūpām, universally approachable yet ultimately unfathomable. How, then, can Jayatīrtha claim that Madhva’s writings are “not easily understandable for beginners”?

The resolution lies in distinguishing two levels:

Surface level: Madhva’s works are indeed straightforward and approachable for new students. In fact, some opponents dismissed them as “childlike” because of this surface clarity.
Deeper level: Beneath that simplicity lies a rich depth of subtle meaning and layered intention. Uncovering this requires training, philosophical maturity, and effort.

Thus, Madhva’s writings are both easy and difficult – easy on the surface, difficult in depth. The purpose of Śrī Jayatīrtha’s Pramāṇa-paddhati is to excavate these deeper meanings and present them systematically, making his master’s thought accessible to all, including beginners.

The Methodology of Śāstric Exposition

Before turning to the discussion of pramāṇa itself, we should familiriarize ourselves with the structured four-part framework that most Indian philosophical texts employ when introducing a concept:

Uddeśa: Calling the concept merely by its name.
Lakṣaṇa: Defining the concept with a precise identifier.
Vibhāga: Classifying the concept into its various kinds.
Parīkṣā: Examining and evaluating the definition and classification, often through comparison with rival views.

Uddeśa is straightforward: merely uttering the word pramāṇa counts as uddeśa. This has already been done in the title and the invocation verse. But lakṣaṇa requires careful treatment: what it means, what it excludes, and why it matters. We must first spend some time on this, and then proceed to the lakṣaṇa of pramāṇa itself.

The lakṣaṇa

A lakṣaṇa is an attribute or characteristic (dharma) that serves as a precise identifier for a class of objects. To function as a valid lakṣaṇa, an attribute must satisfy two conditions:

It must be pervasively (vyāptyā) present in the entire target class (lakṣya).
It must be completely absent from everything outside the target class (alakṣya).

In English, lakṣaṇa is best rendered as identifier or identification mark. In more popular writing, the word “definition” is often used in the same sense.

The Classical Example: The Cow

The traditional example used to illustrate the idea of lakṣaṇa is that of a cow (go): sāsnādimatvam, or “possessing a dewlap and other characteristic features.”

The attribute, the dewlap (sāsnā), is present in all cows.
It is not present in other entities like cats, deers, or dogs.

The suffix “-ādi” (etc.) is important because the dewlap alone may be found in other creatures (like a cock). The complete lakṣaṇa is a set of attributes (dewlap, hump, horns, specific tail, four legs, etc.) that, when taken together, are found exclusively and universally within the class of cows. This set of attributes serves as the right identifier.

The alakṣaṇa

The opposite concept is referred to as an alakṣaṇa. The text states, “anyathābhūtam tu alakṣaṇam,” which means, “that which is otherwise is a non-definition.” The word anyathā, or “otherwise,” signifies a failure to meet the two essential criteria of a proper definition. An attribute that fails in this way is considered an alakṣaṇa, or a flawed definition.

There are three ways in which an attribute can fail to be a proper lakṣaṇa. These failures are the doṣas or flaws. The three flaws are asambhava (impossibility), avyāpti (partial inapplicability), and ativyāpti (over-extension). The attributes that suffer from these flaws are, in turn, called asambhavī, avyāpaka, and ativyāpaka, respectively.

Asambhavi (Impossibile)

The first type of flawed definition arises from the flaw of asambhava. The resulting flawed attribute is called an asambhavi-dharma. This flaw occurs when the proposed defining attribute is not present in any member of the group being defined.

Example: If we were to define a cow using the attribute of having a single, undivided hoof (ekaśaphatva), this would be an asambhavi definition. No cow possesses a single hoof; that is a characteristic of animals like horses. Because the attribute is entirely absent from the target group, the definition is impossible.

Avyāptaka (Partially Inapplicable)

The second type of flawed definition is caused by the flaw of avyāpti. An attribute suffering from this is called an avyāpaka-dharma. This flaw occurs when the attribute is present in some members of the target group but not in all of them.

Example: Defining a cow by its variegated color or spotted skin (śābalatva) is an example of this flaw. While some cows are indeed spotted, many others are not. Because the attribute does not encompass the entire group of lakṣyas, it suffers from partial inapplicability and is therefore a flawed definition. It is not asambhavi, because some cows do have this trait, but it is avyāpaka because not all do.

Ativyāpaka (Over-extended)

The third type of flawed definition stems from the flaw of ativyāpti. The corresponding flawed attribute is an ativyāpaka-dharma. This flaw occurs when the attribute, while may very well be present in the target group, also extends to objects outside of that group.

Example: Defining a cow by “having horns” (viṣāṇitva) illustrates this flaw. While it is true that cows have horns, so do other animals like buffaloes and deer. The attribute “oversteps” the boundary of the defined group and extends to others. Because it is not exclusive to the lakṣya, the definition is flawed by over-extension.

In summary, a proper lakṣaṇa must perfectly and exclusively map onto the group being defined. If an attribute fails to do so, it is an alakṣaṇa.

If the attribute is entirely absent from the target group, the flaw is asambhava.
If it is present in only some members of the group, the flaw is avyāpti.
If it is present in the group but also extends to others outside of it, the flaw is ativyāpti.

What is the Use of a lakṣaṇa?

Why is it important to understand what a lakṣaṇa is? What practical benefit (prayojana—) does knowledge of a correct definition provide

According to Śrī Jayatīrtha, understanding a lakṣaṇa serves two fundamental purposes:

Lakṣya-avadhāraṇa — the ability to identify the object itself precisely.
Śabda-vyavahāraḥ — the ability to use the correct word for the correct object in communication.

Let us examine each benefit in turn.

1. Identifying the Object (lakṣya-avadhāraṇa)

The principal advantage of a well-formulated lakṣaṇa is that it enables unambiguous identification (‘avadhāraṇa’) of the target object. This umabiguity is in the nature of sajātīya-vijātīya-vyāvṛtti: distinguishing the target both from similar items (sajātīya) and from dissimilar items (vijātīya).

Example: The House of Devadatta

Consider Śrī Jayatīrtha’s example. Suppose you are told, “Devadatta’s house is in this village.”

Without a proper lakṣaṇa: every house in the village is a candidate; your knowledge remains vague and speculative; you might point to any house and say, “Perhaps this is it.”
With a proper lakṣaṇa: suppose you are told, “Devadatta’s house is the one with a flag (dhvaja) on its roof.” Armed with that defining mark, you can survey the houses and immediately identify the correct one. On seeing the flagged house you attain avadhāraṇa—the secure cognition expressed as idam eva, na anyat (“this is the one and no other”).

This cognitive process of moving from general possibility to precise identification is the first benefit of a good lakṣaṇa.

2. Correct Use of Language (śabda-vyavahāraḥ)

The second benefit concerns linguistic practice: a lakṣaṇa enables us to apply the appropriate word to the appropriate referent, which is the foundation of reliable communication.

Example: The Word “Cow”

We have defined a cow (go) earlier by its sāsnādimatvam, or “possessing a dewlap and other characteristic features”. When you possess this lakṣaṇa-jñāna (knowledge of the identifer), you inspect animals in the environment and, upon encountering one that exhibits a dewlap and other associated features, you recognize immediately that the word “cow” (go) is applicable to that animal (taṁ go-śabda-vācyaṁ pratyeti). Thus, lakṣaṇa knowledge supports not only perception but correct naming and consequent communication.

Defining the lakṣya

Śrī Jayatīrtha then uses the two benefits above to address a subtle methodological point: what, precisely, is the lakṣya? We have been using the term lakṣya (the target group) throughout without defining it. If one were to define the lakṣya simply as “that of which we give a lakṣaṇa,” one would fall into circularity (anyonyāśraya): the concept of lakṣaṇa would be explained in terms of lakṣya, and lakṣya in terms of lakṣaṇa.

To avoid this, Śrī Jayatīrtha defines lakṣya more robustly: the lakṣya is the object or conceptual group that one intends to distinguish from all others and for which one intends to employ a single, common name. In other words, the lakṣya is a purpose-driven mental grouping: we first decide, “I will isolate this set of things and treat them as one kind,” and only then do we test candidate lakṣaṇas against that intended group to see if they evade the three classical fallacies.

Defining Pramāṇa

Some preliminary considerations

In the preceding discussion, we examined the opening verse of the text, which not only served as a maṅgala-śloka but also indicated the four preliminary elements of philosophical writing, known as the anubandha-catuṣṭaya: viṣaya (subject matter), adhikārī (qualified student), prayojana (purpose), and sambandha (relation). Having clarified the necessity of this work, especially given that Śrī Madhvācārya had already written on related topics, the author discussed the idea of lakṣaṇa in detail.

And, that was for a reason: Indian philosophical traditions commonly adopt a fourfold framework when presenting any concept: uddeśa, lakṣaṇa, vibhāga, and parīkṣā. Uddeśa refers to the mere indication of the topic, usually by name. Lakṣaṇa is the definition of that topic. Vibhāga involves classification into categories. Parīkṣā refers to critical examination or evaluation. Following this convention, the topic of pramāṇa must also be introduced and analyzed in this manner. Since uddeśa is a simple matter – merely naming the concept – the author didn’t discuss that, but devoted greater attention to lakṣaṇa, the definition, for without clarity in definition the subsequent classification (vibhāga), and evaluation (parīkṣā) cannot be meaningfully undertaken.

A brief note on parīkṣā is in order before proceeding further. Examination (parīkṣā) serves different purposes depending on the stage of analysis. There is little to examine in the case of uddeśa, since it is merely the naming of the topic. But in the case of lakṣaṇa, careful scrutiny is required: one must test the proposed definition for logical faults such as ativyāpti (over-extension) or avyāpti (under-extension). Similarly, in the case of vibhāga, one must justify the precise number of categories—why the division is neither too many nor too few. Furthermore, the method of examination itself must be examined. At first sight, this may seem to lead to an infinite regress: if we must examine the examination, must we then examine that examination, and so on endlessly? The tradition resolves this by holding that the regress terminates once we establish that the method of examination itself is coherent and justified.

The General Definition (Sāmānya-Lakṣaṇa) of Pramāṇa

Now equipped with this framework, we can delve into the definition of Pramāṇa. The text first gives the general definition (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) of pramāṇa. Later, specific subtypes of pramāṇa will be defined by means of special definitions (viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa). Following Madhvācārya’s Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa, the definition adopted is:

yathārthaṃ pramāṇam — Pramāṇa is that which cognised an object as is.

At first sight, this definition may appear tautological, since both terms “yathārtham” and “pramāṇam” could be taken as synonymous. However, the commentators carefully distinguish their functions. In any definitional statement (lakṣaṇa-vākya), one term indicates the object to be defined (lakṣya), while the other provides the definition (lakṣaṇa). In this case, the word pramāṇam points to the object that is being defined. We know the word pramāṇa, but we seek to understand its nature. And, the word yathārtham is giving the lakṣaṇa, the actual definition that explains the nature of the target concept.

Some commentators suggest a further principle: in a lakṣaṇa-vākya, the opening component is usually the definition, while the closing component names the defined entity. Thus here, “yathārtham” serves as the definition, while “pramāṇam” identifies the entity being defined. Others hold that this order is not rigid; the crucial point is to distinguish between what is being defined and the characteristic by which it is defined.

Analyzing the term yathārtham

The term yathārtham is a compound of yathā and artha, each of which admits multiple meanings.

yathā can mean “similarity,” “repetition,” “capability,” or “non-transgression” (anatikrama).
artha can mean “meaning,” “wealth,” “object,” or “end.”

In this context, commentators take yathā in the sense of “non-transgression” and artha in the sense of “cognizable object.” Etymologically, artha derives from the root ṛ meaning gati (movement), which in Sanskrit also implies avagati or jñāna (knowing). When combined with a suffix that denotes the object of an action (karmaṇi artha), we get the word artha, which therefore means “that which is to be known” (jñeyam), or a cognizable object.

When compounded, yathārtham therefore means: “that which cognizes the object without transgressing its boundaries” – that is, knowledge or instruments that correspond to the object as it truly is.

A good definition must not only include what is intended but also exclude what is not. Let us apply that text to this definition and examine the two roles of two components in this definition: “that which cognizes the object" and "without transgressing its boundaries”.

Understanidng jñeya-viṣayīkāritva and its implications

The expression “that which cognizes the object” (jñeya-viṣayīkāritva) has two distinct connotations:

Direct cognition: Knowledge itself, which apprehends the object directly. This is called kevala-pramāṇa.
Instrumental cognition: The means or instrument that enables knowledge of the object. This is called anu-pramāṇa.

Thus, pramāṇa refers both to valid knowledge and to the instruments by which such knowledge is generated. Popular understanding often limits pramāṇa to only the second category – the tools/means of knowledge. However, Śrī Jayatīrtha’s definition is comprehensive, including both right knowledge itself (kevala-pramāṇa) and its instruments (anu-pramāṇa). The definition thereby avoids avyāpti (under-inclusion), since it accommodates both.

At the same time, it avoids ativyāpti (over-inclusion) into the knower (pramātṛ) and the knowable object (prameya). Although the knower (pramātṛ) and the knowable object (prameya) also participate in the process of knowing, they do not have an “object” per se. The act of knowing and the tools of knowing have the object as their focus, whereas the knower is the agent and the known is the object itself. Also, even if they both are connected to the processes of knowing, they are not the instrument of cognition. Therefore, only knowledge and its instruments satisfy the criterion of jñeya-viṣayīkaraṇatva.

Understanidng the role of yathā and its implications

The qualifying term yathā – “without transgressing” – ensures that not all cognitions or instruments of cognition are counted as pramāṇa. By specifying that a pramāṇa must cognise the object as it is, the definition automatically excludes invalid forms of cognition like doubt (saṃśaya) and error (viparyaya), as well as the instruments that lead to them. These forms of cognition “cross the boundary” of the object’s true nature and are therefore not pramāṇa.

Thus, the phrase yathārthaṃ pramāṇam yields a precise and carefully delimited definition: pramāṇa is either the knowledge that apprehends an object as it truly is, or the instrument by which such knowledge arises. It excludes both under-extension and over-extension, and thereby is in fact a robust definition.

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Let’s now take a small digression, and discuss some terms that we used as out-groups for pramāṇa. Those are: saṃśaya (doubt), and viparyaya (erroneous cognition). Let’s discuss their definitions, causes, categories, processes and theories, before we get back to further discussion on pramāṇas.